Business standard Sunday, Oct 17, 2010
Instead of learning from the forces, are we doing to defence what we did to sports
Suresh Bangara / October 15, 2010, 0:20 IST
If India can organise a Republic Day parade every year with great efficiency, and could recently host successfully World Military Games, why did it mess up the organisation of the Commonwealth Games (CWG)?
What is common to successful mass events is an empowered structure with clear demarcation of responsibility and accountability. The CWG failed due to an absence of a centralised command structure. Responsibilities were not demarcated, there were too many “Indians” and no chiefs, and, what is more, everyone had an excuse not to own up responsibility.
November 13, 2003 was the date on which the Commonwealth Games Federation (CGF) resolved to hand over the Games to Delhi. In accordance with article 10A, the host city contract was inked by the Government of India (GoI), the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi(GNCTD), the IOA and the CGF. The organisation of the entire event was allotted to the Organising Committee (OC) of the CWG.
Although representatives of all the delivery partners were constituted on the committee, raising alarms at the CWG meetings, when deadline after deadline failed to be met by their parent organisation, is not a practical proposition. Having taken full responsibility for staging the best ever Games, as outlined on the website, the OC perhaps continued at best as a mute spectator to inter-ministerial red tape and embarrassing delays in execution.
What is needed in the globalised, highly competitive and demanding environment is to professionalise our decision-making structures to include experts in negotiations, project management and other niche areas.
A look at the ministry which manages the armed forces of India in the above context would be instructive. The defence ministry has the responsibility to handle the rapidly increasing defence budget, which is more than twice the amount allotted to the CWG, but on a yearly basis. Is it structured to meet all the requirements of the armed forces of India?
First, since 1952, the three chiefs along with their headquarters were removed from the decision-making structure of the GoI. They were designated as the “attached offices” of the ministry. In effect, all communications from the armed forces were to be addressed only to the ministry and no decision-making power and executive power was to reside with the chiefs, save those related to operations. Not even the revenue budget could be operated by the chief to merely run the service as it existed. The chiefs could send their recommendations and plans for modernisation, which effectively rested at the table of some functionary without even an acknowledgement. The ministry continued to be manned by generalists — civil servants who often learnt about the armed forces after they were placed in the chair.
While the authority to take decisions with the concurrence of the minister was vested with the ministry, there were no provisions for accountability. Having been removed from the chain, the chiefs could only make proposals and could not be held accountable. The procurement of Advanced Jet Trainers(AJTs) for the Air Force took over two decades, by which time costs had escalated by 500 per cent. The decision to induct Gorshkov took over a decade, by which time the deteriorating cables of the ship warranted doubling of the original cost. Many thousand crores are surrendered unspent year after year despite the urgent operational needs of the Army. There are no clear-cut penalties for procrastination and opportunity costs incurred thereof. Are these not the ills of the CWG as well?
Second, integration of the ministry with the armed forces by placing uniformed professionals at appropriate desks of the ministry is a successful model practised by other democracies. Similar structures were recommended by the Committee on Defence Management after the Kargil war. Cosmetic changes in nomenclature with no corresponding powers were the only action taken to show compliance.
Thirdly, the Kargil Review Committee did recommend the creation of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) as a single-point adviser to the defence minister on all matters of planning, acquisition etc. This has been stalled by status quo-ists within and without the armed forces. The result is the continuation of a toothless Chiefs of Staff Committee, which was first recommended in 1924 and which is still in existence only in India. Almost all armed forces of countries that matter have opted for a fully integrated structure with accountability, while we continue to live in denial of a serious structural infirmity.
The CWG 2010 has brought disrepute to the country due to delays in implementation despite seven years to prepare. We can live with it, for soon it will be forgotten. However, continued denial of structural weaknesses in the defence department has the potential to lay our country in the dust. Until then, incapability to modernise, lack of timely decision coupled with conflicting demands of the three services can only be offset by the ability of our officers and soldiers to lay down their lives — even if it is to achieve a pyrrhic victory.
The author is a retired admiral of the Indian Navy
Learning from CWG
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