The Indian armed forces must plan to take on potential adversaries
The problems of the Indian armed forces are in all three areas— organisation, equipment and doctrine, and, the joker in the pack—political direction.In the early 1980s, the political directive to the three services was that they were to maintain “dissuasive deterrence” vis-à-vis Pakistan and “defensive deterrence” in relation to China. This meant that they had to have the capability of undertaking a deep offensive into Pakistan, but with regard to China the policy was to have the kind of defensive strength that would dissuade Beijing from a military strike. Factor in nuclear capability and the doctrine itself changes as was clear in the Kargil war when India insisted in limiting it to the incursion area. There have been several efforts to amend it—the “limited war” idea during General V.P. Malik’s time and the “cold start” doctrine during General S. Padmanabhan’s tenure.
Whenever political direction has been clear—1947, 1971, 1999—the armed forces have performed well. Whenever it has been confused or absent, there is frustration and disaster—1965 and 1962. The armed forces are treated as an ancillary department of the Government. They are consulted, but do not form the part of decision-making. The armed forces should become part of the national security decision making process and should be given clear politico-military directives.
Extracted from: Be fast and precise
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